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GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS AND RULES: 
INCREASING EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN THE REGULATORY WORLD 
HALE MELNICK* 
Abstract: Guidance documents pose a peculiar problem in administrative law. 
Although guidance documents are supposed to be non-binding memoranda, they 
sometimes have the effect of creating binding law in practice. Courts lack an ef-
fective way to determine when guidance documents are essentially binding. This 
Note examines why past, current, and proposed judicial tests for determining 
whether guidance documents are binding are flawed, and it proposes an alterna-
tive model based on executive review. 
INTRODUCTION 
The role and validity of guidance documents present a complicated and 
confusing problem in administrative law.1 Guidance documents are, generally 
speaking, non-binding rules issued by agencies that fill the gaps left by statutes 
and administrative rules.2 With the increase of complex statutes and adminis-
trative rules, newly released court decisions, and changing administrations, 
guidance documents allow agencies to keep pace with the ever-changing law 
and keep the public informed of what that law is.3 Yet guidance documents 
also pose a threat to the legitimacy and fairness of administrative law.4 Alt-
hough there is no simple answer for balancing the necessity of guidance doc-
uments on the one hand, and the dangers of them on the other, this Note aims 
to provide a workable solution.5 
Part I discusses basic procedures and principles of administrative law, in-
cluding the Administrative Procedure Act, and the two main methods agencies 
                                                                                                                           
 * Senior Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–
2017. 
 1 See David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the Short Cut, 
120 YALE L.J. 276, 276 (2010); Sam Kalen, Changing Administrations and Environmental Guidance 
Documents, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Fall 2008, at 13, 13. 
 2 Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of the Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 477–78 (2013). 
 3 Sam Kalen, The Transformation of Modern Administrative Law: Changing Administrations and 
Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 657, 657 (2008). 
 4 See Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 
90 TEX. L. REV. 331, 333 (2011).  
 5 See infra notes 38–88 and accompanying text (describing benefits and problems associated with 
guidance documents), notes 239–300 and accompanying text (proposing a solution). 
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use to implement the statutes they administer—rulemaking and adjudication.6 
Part I then discusses guidance documents in greater detail, explaining what 
they are, why they are beneficial, and why they can be troublesome.7 Parts II 
and III describe two methods by which scholars and the courts handle chal-
lenges to guidance documents, and they explain why these methods do not 
solve the problem.8 Finally, Part IV of this Note proposes an alternative solu-
tion, whereby Congress creates an agency under the control of the executive to 
review guidance documents.9 
I. THE AGENCY TOOL BELT: RULES, ADJUDICATIONS,  
AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) governs rulemaking proce-
dures, including procedures for generating guidance documents, for all federal 
agencies.10 The APA was passed to create democratic checks on agencies.11 
This was accomplished in part by requiring public participation in the rulemak-
ing process and by establishing standards of judicial review for agency actions, 
findings, and conclusions of law.12 Congress hoped that formal procedures 
would mitigate the inconsistent and unfair results agencies arrived at through 
ad hoc decision making, and that they would create a more predictable and 
lasting system of rules.13 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See infra notes 10–31 and accompanying text (discussing general procedures and principles of 
administrative law). 
 7 See infra notes 32–105 and accompanying text (explaining what guidance documents are and 
why they are both beneficial and problematic). 
 8 See infra notes 106–234 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing procedural challeng-
es to guidance documents, and introducing and analyzing “the short cut” approach). 
 9 See infra notes 235–296 and accompanying text (proposing a solution). 
 10 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (2012); Sean Croston, The Peti-
tion Is Mightier Than the Sword: Rediscovering an Old Weapon in the Battles Over “Regulation 
Through Guidance,” 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 381, 383 (2011). 
 11 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521; John D. Graham & James 
W. Broughel, Stealth Regulation: Addressing Agency Evasion of OIRA and the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 1 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 30, 32 (2014). 
 12 See Graham & Broughel, supra note 11, at 32; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 13 Kalen, supra note 3, at 662 n.11 (citing Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agen-
cies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872–83 (1962)). Ad hoc is 
defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[f]ormed for a particular purpose.” Ad Hoc, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In contrast to rules, ad hoc policymaking refers to adjudicatory proceed-
ings where agencies make decisions on a case-by-case basis. Kalen, supra note 3, at 663; see also 
Edward W. Warren, “More Good Than Harm”: A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and 
Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 406 (1993) (noting Justice Scalia’s warning that the ab-
sence of rules “leads to different treatment of similar cases, a lack of consistency and predictability, 
and ultimately to ‘judicial arbitrariness’”). 
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A. Rulemaking and Notice-and-Comment Requirements 
The APA establishes two methods for an agency to promulgate rules: 
formal and informal rulemaking.14 Informal rulemaking, the more common 
form, requires three basic steps.15 First, the agency must give general notice of 
the proposed rule by publishing it in the Federal Register.16 This notice re-
quirement alerts interested parties that the agency is contemplating adopting a 
new rule, and gives those parties an opportunity to respond.17 Second, the 
agency must give interested parties an opportunity to participate in the process 
through “submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without op-
portunity for oral presentation.”18 Third, after the agency considers the pre-
sented information, it “shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general 
statement of their basis and purpose.”19 Formal rulemaking, which among oth-
er things requires cross-examination of adverse witnesses and the opportunity 
for oral presentation, has largely disappeared.20 Once a rule is promulgated and 
adopted by the agency, the rule is binding and non-retroactive.21 
B. Adjudication 
Agencies may also use adjudication to issue orders enforcing their rules 
and the statutes they administer.22 In an adjudicative proceeding, an agency 
formulates an order, which the APA defines as “a final disposition . . . in a mat-
                                                                                                                           
 14 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–557; Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 335–41. 
 15 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (outlining the rulemaking procedures under the Administrative Procedure 
Act); Steven Croley, Making Rules: An Introduction, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1511, 1513 (1995); Graham & 
Broughel, supra note 11, at 33. 
 16 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). The notice must include: “(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of 
public rule making proceedings; (2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; 
and (3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues 
involved.” Id. § 553(b)(1)–(3). 
 17 See Id. § 553(b); Croley, supra note 15, at 1513. The Federal Register is “[a] daily publication 
containing presidential proclamations and executive orders, federal-agency regulations of general 
applicability and legal effect, proposed agency rules, and documents required by law to be published.” 
Federal Register, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The National Archives and Records 
Administration publishes the Federal Register. Id. 
 18 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). 
 19 Id. 
 20 See Id. §§ 556, 557; Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 374 n.44 (2000). In United States 
v. Florida East Coast Railway Co., the Supreme Court held that the formal rulemaking procedures 
established under 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–557 are triggered only when the statute requires that the rulemak-
ing procedure take place “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing” either explicitly or 
where similar statutory language is present. 410 U.S. 224, 236 (1973); John F. Stanley, Note, The 
“Magic Words” of § 554: A New Test for Formal Adjudication Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1067, 1075 (2005). 
 21 Connor R. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 
119 YALE L.J. 782, 788 (2010). 
 22 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–557 (setting out APA requirements for formal and informal adjudica-
tions). 
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ter other than rule making . . . .”23 Whereas rulemaking is often considered 
quasi-legislative because the agency is creating law that is binding, adjudica-
tion is considered quasi-judicial because it is applying existing law to facts, 
and binds only those parties involved in the adjudication.24 Under this concep-
tion, rulemaking is prospective and general, whereas adjudication is retrospec-
tive and specific.25 In practice though, it is often unclear when an agency 
should proceed by rulemaking or by adjudication.26 
C. Entering an Age of Rulemaking 
In 1947, the Supreme Court held that agencies had discretion regarding 
when they should use adjudication versus rulemaking.27 More recently, however, 
administrative law has transitioned toward an era of rulemaking.28 This transi-
tion was in large part a result of agencies gaining more responsibilities to regu-
late industries that were too complex for them to rely on case-by-case adjudica-
tions.29 In addition, Congress increasingly mandated that agencies follow notice-
and-comment rulemaking procedures.30 Yet the trend toward rulemaking has not 
put an end to the question of how agencies ultimately regulate entities.31 
D. Guidance Documents: An Introduction 
Exacerbating the problem of when agencies must promulgate rules (as 
opposed to making ad hoc decisions through adjudication) is the difficulty of 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id. §§ 551(6)–(7) (defining “order” and “adjudication” for purposes of the APA). 
 24 See Samuel Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contributions of Judge Harold Leventhal to 
Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 909–10 (1980). 
 25 See id. Compare Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) 
(increase on valuation of all taxable property in Denver held as a rule because it affected residents of 
an entire city), with Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (tax levied on 
small group of residents held as an adjudication because its effect was on a specific group). 
 26 See Estreicher, supra note 24, at 911. 
 27 Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 201–02 (1947) (holding it 
was not beyond the Securities and Exchange Commission’s authority to adjudicate an issue that it had 
not yet anticipated through rulemaking). 
 28 William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 38 
(1975); J. Skelly Wright, The Courts and the Rulemaking Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 375, 375 (1974). 
 29 See Pedersen, supra note 28, at 38 (noting complex matters agencies regulate such as pollution, 
energy, occupational health and safety, coal mining safety, and consumer product safety). 
 30 Id.; see Robert W. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: 
The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276, 1315–26 
(1972); see, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 811 (2012) (mandating the agency give notice and accept public com-
ments when promulgating rules related to health and safety standards in coal mines); 42 U.S.C. § 
300g-1 (2012) (mandating the agency give notice and review public comments before deciding to 
regulate contaminants found in drinking water). 
 31 See Pedersen, supra note 28, at 41. 
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distinguishing rules from guidance documents.32 The Office of Management 
and Budget defines guidance documents as “statement[s] of general applicabil-
ity and future effect, other than [regulations] . . . that set[ ] forth a policy on a 
statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or 
regulatory issue.”33 Guidance documents come in many forms, including inter-
pretations of existing rules, policy statements, training manuals for internal 
agency use, compliance guides, advisory opinions tailored to individual case 
facts, and memoranda from agency leaders providing direction to agency staff 
members.34 There are far more guidance documents than rules, and approxi-
mately ten times more rules than enacted legislation.35 Guidance documents 
are exempt from the notice-and-comment requirements under Section 553 of 
the APA.36 The ability for agencies to forgo notice-and-comment procedures 
when creating guidance documents has significant consequences for the legit-
imacy and workability of the administrative state.37 
1. Importance of Guidance Documents 
There are a number of good reasons for agencies to issue guidance docu-
ments.38 First, they help regulated entities understand complicated regula-
tions.39 Second, guidance documents help agencies apply and enforce the law 
predictably and regularly.40 Third, when a statute is unclear, guidance docu-
ments provide notice to the general public about what the law is in advance of 
enforcement.41 
a. Guidance Documents Clarify the Law 
In effect, guidance documents provide free legal advice to parties dealing 
with complicated legal issues.42 By providing stakeholders with guidance on 
                                                                                                                           
 32 See Franklin, supra note 1, at 278; infra notes 106–234 and accompanying text (describing two 
popular methods of distinguishing rules from guidance documents and concluding that neither method 
is sufficient). 
 33 Office of Management and Budget, Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 
Fed. Reg. 3432, 3434 (Jan. 25, 2007); see Croston, supra note 10, at 382. 
 34 Raso, supra note 21, at 788. 
 35 Id. at 785–86. 
 36 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012) (“Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this sub-
section does not apply—(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency 
organization, procedure, or practice . . . .”). 
 37 See infra notes 32–105 and accompanying text (describing benefits and problems arising from 
guidance documents). 
 38 See, e.g., Croston, supra note 10, at 382; Nina Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Infor-
mal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 408 (2007). 
 39 Croston, supra note 10, at 382. 
 40 Id. at 383. 
 41 Id. (quoting Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
 42 Id. at 382–83; see Raso, supra note 21, at 822. 
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regulations in the face of uncertainty, these documents reduce the number of 
individual requests for clarification that the agency would otherwise address.43 
Clarification of the law is particularly important for agencies administer-
ing complex environmental programs.44 For example, a 2002 memorandum 
written by the Director of the Office of Groundwater and Drinking Water pro-
vided clarity on how to calculate the Maximum Contaminant Level (“MCL”) 
for arsenic in drinking water.45 The EPA had promulgated a rule that required 
arsenic levels to decrease to .01 mg/L by 2006, and it stated that arsenic sam-
pling results be reported to the nearest .001 mg/L.46 Subsequently, the Director 
clarified in a memorandum that all measurements greater than or equal to 
.0105 mg/L would violate the EPA arsenic rule—because she believed it was 
best for the EPA to round up the measurement.47 The Director explained that 
this method of calculation was supported by cost benefit analysis, and that it 
received public and stakeholder input.48 Although the Director’s guidance is 
not binding, it does alert entities, agency staff, and the public to the agency’s 
stance, which is helpful when the regulations are unclear.49 
b. Guidance Documents Provide Predictability and Regularity 
Guidance documents also help agencies apply and enforce the law pre-
dictably in an ever-changing landscape of statutory and regulatory law.50 Court 
decisions can change agency assumptions and interpretations of law, Congress 
can change laws, new information can become available to the agency that 
makes the agency rethink its positions, and a new administration might be vot-
ed in and change its position entirely.51 Guidance documents allow agencies to 
fill in the gaps quickly when promulgating rules is inefficient or unlikely.52 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Croston, supra note 10, at 382–83. 
 44 Kalen, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 45 Memorandum from Cynthia C. Dougherty, Dir. Office of Ground Water & Drinking Water, to 
Water Div. Dirs., Regions, I–X, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Jan. 25, 2002), https://nepis.epa.gov/ 
[https://perma.cc/UQQ6-DETQ] (to generate memorandum, follow link provided, type “WSG151” into 
search box, click search, then click hyperlink entitled “WSG151”). 
 46 40 C.F.R. § 141.23(i)(4) (2001). 
 47 Dougherty, supra note 45. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 141.23(i)(4); Kalen, supra note 1, at 14 (not-
ing the particular importance of agency guidance for technical environmental programs); Dougherty, 
supra note 45. 
 50 See Croston, supra note 10, at 383; Kalen, supra note 1, at 15. 
 51 See Kalen, supra note 1, at 15. For example, Justice Rehnquist noted in his opinion in Motor 
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. that a change in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration policy regarding seatbelts 
and airbags seemed to be related to a change in political administrations. 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 52 See Croston, supra note 10, at 383–84. 
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Based on the language of the arsenic regulation, for example, it would not 
be unreasonable for an agency staffer to determine that an arsenic sample of 
.0105 mg/L is not a violation, because the staffer could interpret the rule to 
apply only to the thousandth place.53 By circulating the memorandum, the 
agency is more likely to provide consistent results.54 
c. Guidance Documents Provide Notice to the Public 
Guidance documents provide notice to the public about what the law is 
and how the agency will enforce it.55 Because guidance documents apply pro-
spectively, they are generally more reliable than adjudications in regard to how 
the agency will act in the future.56 Adjudications are typically backward look-
ing, and they apply only to the specific facts presented in the case.57 Entities 
are in a better position if they know how agencies will react, so guidance doc-
uments will save agencies time and money in many instances.58 
An employee testing arsenic levels for a hypothetical entity, then, would 
be able to determine how the agency would rule before submitting an applica-
tion.59 This would save the entity time and money, and the entity could chal-
lenge the agency’s interpretation in court if it felt the agency’s interpretation 
was improper.60 
2. Problems with Guidance Documents 
Despite their many advantages, guidance documents also pose a number 
of problems.61 First, because guidance documents are exempt from the notice-
and-comment procedures, they threaten the legitimacy of agencies, which un-
dermines their claim to act on behalf of Congress and the President.62 Second, 
because agencies typically do not consult interested parties prior to issuing 
                                                                                                                           
 53 See id. at 383; Dougherty, supra note 45. 
 54 See Croston, supra note 10, at 383; Dougherty, supra note 45. 
 55 See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 341. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See Londoner v. City & Cty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (tax levied on small 
group of residents held as an adjudication because its effect was on a specific group); Franklin, supra 
note 1, at 312–13; supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (distinguishing generally the difference 
between rulemaking and adjudication). 
 58 See Franklin, supra note 1, at 316; Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 341. 
 59 See Croston, supra note 10, at 383; Dougherty, supra note 45. 
 60 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012); Croston, supra note 10, at 383. 
 61 See, e.g. Croston, supra note 10, at 382–84 (discussing benefits of guidance documents); Men-
delson, supra note 38, at 408 (noting guidance documents sometimes allow agencies to circumvent 
important notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures); Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 342 (noting 
agencies are not required to consult with parties affected by guidance documents). 
 62 See Mendelson, supra note 38, at 417–18 (discussing theories the legitimacy of the administra-
tive state); infra notes 65–83 and accompanying text (explaining why guidance documents undermine 
agencies’ legitimacy). 
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guidance documents, they lack critical input that would help them create better 
rules.63 Third, if an entity seeks to challenge a guidance document, doctrines of 
finality and ripeness may prevent them from having their day in court.64 
a. Guidance Documents Threaten the Legitimacy of Agency Action 
By issuing guidance documents, agencies circumvent the costly and time-
consuming—but democratically important—notice-and-comment require-
ments.65 Understanding why this causes concern requires an understanding of 
the administrative framework.66 
The authority of federal agencies to govern is not clearly addressed in the 
Constitution.67 Under Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, all legislative 
powers are granted to Congress.68 Under Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 and 
Article II, Section 3, Clause 5, the President, through the Appointments 
Clause, may appoint Officers of the United States to assist in the execution of 
laws passed by Congress.69 Thus, one could envision agencies as agents of 
Congress, and the President as merely putting the laws of Congress into ef-
fect.70 This view assumes that Congress makes all of the important determina-
tions in its statutes and agencies simply direct the traffic.71 But because Con-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 342; infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text (noting that 
issuing guidance documents does not demand input from entities). 
 64 See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 375–84; infra notes 87–98 and accompanying text (identifying 
doctrines of finality and ripeness as hurdles to judicial review of guidance documents). 
 65 Graham & Broughel, supra note 11, at 39; see Mendelson, supra note 38, at 408 (comparing 
the agency expense of issuing a guidance document versus the agency expense of going through no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking); Raso, supra note 21, at 785 (noting concern that agencies try to avoid 
notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures meant to facilitate public participation and allow the 
elected branches to monitor agencies). 
 66 See Mendelson, supra note 38, at 417 (establishing framework for administrative state). 
 67 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3 (constitutional provisions 
governing agency action). 
 68 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”). 
 69 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id., art. II, § 3, cl. 5. Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution 
states: 
[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Su-
preme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not 
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law: but the Congress 
may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers, as they think proper, in the 
President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. 
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Article II, Section 3, Clause 5 of the Constitution states: “[The President] . . . shall 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United 
States.” Id. art. II, § 3, cl. 5. 
 70 Mendelson, supra note 38, at 417. 
 71 Id. But see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2260–62 
(2001) (criticizing this model, which the author terms the “transmission belt” model). 
2017] Increasing Executive Accountability in the Regulatory World 365 
gress often grants agencies the authority to make value-based policy determi-
nations, agencies have become something much more than mere proxies.72 
Because agencies derive their power from the president, their authority to 
promulgate rules—and essentially make law—is increasingly defended on the 
basis of presidential control.73 Agencies are viewed as an extension of the Pres-
ident, and their actions are a part of the presidential election.74 Therefore, to be 
a legitimate actor in American governance, agencies must be transparent in 
their decision-making process so that the electorate can evaluate them.75 Con-
gress requires agencies to publish proposed rules in the Federal Register, and it 
requires public participation in the rulemaking process in part to ensure agency 
transparence.76 When agencies promulgate guidance documents without no-
tice-and-comment, they lose some of that transparency.77 
Agencies have a number of reasons to try to circumvent notice-and-
comment procedures.78 First, as a result of judicially mandated procedures and 
congressionally imposed hurdles like oversight by the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”), the promulgation of regulations has become 
increasingly difficult.79 Second, once agencies do promulgate a rule, they must 
often defend their rules when challenged in court, which is a burden of time, 
resources, and political capital.80 Guidance documents, on the other hand, are 
much harder to challenge because of doctrinal impediments like ripeness and 
finality.81 Third, rules tend to attract more attention from Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the public than do guidance documents.82 Heightened attention to 
                                                                                                                           
 72 Mendelson, supra note 38, at 417–18. 
 73 See id. at 418; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3. 
 74 Mendelson, supra note 38, at 418; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (constitutional provision regard-
ing election of the President); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 3 (constitutional provisions governing 
agency action). 
 75 Mendelson, supra note 38, at 418; see John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 893, 904 (2004) (explaining that an opportunity for the public to participate in notice-and-
comment rulemaking can be an effective substitute for the lack of electoral accountability of agen-
cies); supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text (describing the authority of agencies to promulgate 
rules). 
 76 Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty Year Retrospective, 40 ADMIN L. REV. 161, 164 
(1988). 
 77 See id. 
 78 See Raso, supra note 21, at 798–805; infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text (explaining 
why agencies might want to circumvent notice-and-comment rulemaking). 
 79 Kalen, supra note 3, at 665–66; see Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 556 (1978) (finding the D.C. Circuit “unjustifiably intruded into the administrative 
process” by imposing additional hurdles on the agency before the agency could make certain rules); 
Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2764–65 (Jan. 18, 2007) (requiring Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) review of all “significant guidance documents” issued by federal 
agencies). 
 80 See Kalen, supra note 3, at 668; Mendelson, supra note 38, at 408. 
 81 Kalen, supra note 3, at 676. 
 82 Raso, supra note 21, at 799. 
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agency activity often increases collaboration with, and opposition from Con-
gress, limiting the discretion of agencies.83 
b. Agencies Lack Input from Regulated Entities and the Public 
Because the requirements for issuing guidance documents are so minimal, 
agencies do not need to receive input from entities with a strong interest in, or 
knowledge of, the subject matter.84 Comments from these sources are im-
portant to rulemaking because they expose agencies to data, views, and argu-
ments that test the proposed rules.85 When agencies do not receive these com-
ments from the public, they are less informed and are at a greater risk of mak-
ing bad policy.86 
c. Hurdles to Getting into Court 
Parties that wish to challenge guidance documents in court face an uphill 
battle as a consequence of the doctrines of finality and ripeness.87 These doc-
trines generally focus on the suitability of a challenge for review, and the re-
sulting hardship if review is deferred or denied by the court.88 
3. Guidance Documents and Finality 
Section 704 of the APA states that final agency action and agency action 
made reviewable by statute are subject to judicial review.89 Guidance docu-
ments are usually not reviewable by statute because they are generally not con-
sidered final agency action.90 The United States Supreme Court has clarified 
that to be a final agency action, the action must be the “consummation of the 
agency’s decision-making process,” and the action must be one “by which 
rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences 
will flow.”91 The first step essentially requires that the agency’s review of the 
particular matter be complete, and the second step requires that the action have 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. at 799–80 (noting the greater ease at which agencies may act when Congress and special 
interests stay out of the agencies’ affairs). 
 84 Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 342. By contrast, 5 U.S.C. § 553 requires agencies to consider all 
comments submitted by the public. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
 85 See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 342. 
 86 See id. (noting agencies see value in soliciting input from stakeholders with whom they work 
frequently, but that these stakeholders typically are special interests groups who have already orga-
nized and are sufficiently focused on the particular guidance document’s subject matter). 
 87 Kalen, supra note 3, at 676; Raso, supra note 21, at 795. 
 88 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (establishing standard for finality); Abbott 
Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (establishing standard for ripeness). 
 89 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
 90 Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 375; see 5 U.S.C. § 704 (stating which types of agency actions are 
reviewable before a court). 
 91 Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78. 
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some legally binding effect.92 Meeting the second step is difficult because 
guidance documents are not supposed to have legally binding effect.93 The le-
gal test therefore essentially begs the question: is the guidance document really 
a disguised rule?94 
4. Guidance Documents and Ripeness 
Agency action is ripe for review when the issue being litigated is fit for 
judicial decision and the issue poses a hardship to the parties.95 Because guid-
ance documents often have the practical effect of binding parties, there is a 
strong argument that guidance documents pose an immediate hardship to par-
ties and therefore may be ripe for review.96 Yet because guidance documents 
do not have formal legal force, some courts hold that they do not mandate con-
duct and thus cannot pose a hardship.97 And because it is often unclear how 
agencies will apply guidance documents in real life, courts are reluctant to re-
view them until they are applied to concrete cases.98 
5. Guidance Documents Versus Rules 
The distinction between guidance documents and rules is hopelessly 
vague.99 As agencies issue more guidance documents, those guidance docu-
ments are increasingly challenged by regulated entities for being binding rules 
that should have gone through the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.100 
This has led courts in the past few decades to develop tests to determine 
whether a guidance document is in effect a rule.101 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See id. 
 93 Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 378; see Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78. 
 94 See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 380–81; see also Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78 (finding advisory 
opinion was final agency action despite not being legally binding because the advisory opinion “had 
direct and appreciable legal consequences”). 
 95 Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 381 (citing Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149). 
 96 See id. at 381–82. 
 97 Id. at 381; see, e.g., Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 810–11 
(2003) (finding National Park Service guidance document interpreting Contracts Dispute Act did not 
impose hardship on park concessioners directly because it was not authorized to administer the stat-
ute). 
 98 Robert A. Anthony, Interpretative Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the 
Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1312, 1362 (1992) (not-
ing that agencies are “rewarded for stating . . . rules with less precision and authority than might oth-
erwise be required” because courts will be less likely to treat these rules as binding law); Seidenfeld, 
supra note 4, at 383–84 (noting that courts prefer to review guidance documents only in concrete 
cases). 
 99 See Franklin, supra note 1, at 278–79; Graham & Broughel, supra note 11, at 39.   
 100 Stephen M. Johnson, In Defense of the Short Cut, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 495, 509 (2012). 
 101 Hickman, supra note 2, at 479 (describing a number of different tests the courts have applied 
in the past few decades); see infra notes 106–234 and accompanying text (describing in detail the 
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Broadly speaking, courts have two methods to distinguish between ad-
ministrative rules and guidance documents.102 One method is to show proce-
durally that the guidance document is essentially binding on the agency, and 
therefore, that it is a rule that should have gone through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.103 The second method, which is referred to as the “short cut,” is to 
disregard the nature or effect of the guidance document, and instead simply ask 
whether the rule went through notice-and-comment rulemaking.104 If it did, the 
reviewing court should enforce the rule as if it were law; if it did not, the court 
should not give it the force of law.105 
II. CHALLENGING GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS PROCEDURALLY 
One approach to challenging a guidance document is to challenge the 
document procedurally.106 That is to say, courts should consider whether or not 
the guidance document is legally binding as a practical matter.107 As the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated in 1974, “[w]hen 
the agency applies [a] policy in a particular situation, it must be prepared to 
support the policy just as if the policy statement had never been issued.”108 If 
the court determines that the agency is relying on the guidance document itself 
to make its decision, then the court need not affirm it.109 Over the past few 
decades, courts have attempted to devise tests to determine whether guidance 
documents are legally binding in fact.110 
                                                                                                                           
most popular tests established by the courts and legal scholars and explaining why they are insuffi-
cient). 
 102 Compare Franklin, supra note 1, at 279 (discussing substantive challenge to guidance docu-
ments); with Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (applying 
procedural challenge to guidance documents). 
 103 See U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 28 F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (apply-
ing impact on agencies test); Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (applying modern American Mining test); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 39 
(applying legal affects test); Lewis-Mota v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (apply-
ing substantial impact test). 
 104 Franklin, supra note 1, at 279. Legal scholar David Franklin was the first to propose the “short 
cut” method and coin the term. Id. 
 105 See id. 
 106 Id. at 286; see, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 33, 35–36 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974) (outlining the claim alleging that the Federal Power Commission’s informal policy should 
have gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking because policy created a practically legally bind-
ing rule). 
 107 See Anthony, supra note 98, at 1317; Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 345. 
 108 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 39. 
 109 See id. at 40; Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretative” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” 
Rules: Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1, 15 (1994). 
 110 Richard J. Pierce, Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 547, 547 (2000) (noting that courts and commentators have struggled with this question for over 
fifty years); see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 50–51 (applying the legal effects test); Lewis-Mota 
v. Sec’y of Labor, 469 F.2d 478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying the substantial impact test); U.S. Tel. 
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A. Tests to Determine Whether a Guidance Document Is a Rule 
The legal effects test looks at whether the agency used a guidance docu-
ment to create a “binding norm,” or essentially, whether the agency applied the 
guidance document as though it carried the force of law.111 The D.C. Circuit 
applied this test in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission to 
determine whether a statement of policy issued by the Federal Power Commis-
sion (“FPC”) regarding a priority schedule for a gas pipeline was indeed a sub-
stantive rule and thus should have gone through notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing.112 The court held that because the guidance document stated that the FPC 
would reexamine the policy itself in specific cases, the guidance document was 
not intended to be a binding rule, and thus did not require notice-and-comment 
rulemaking procedures.113 The problem with the legal effects test, however, is 
that agencies could significantly influence regulated entities by characterizing 
the guidance as nonbinding in text, but in reality, treat the guidance as manda-
tory.114 
A second method courts have applied is the substantial impact test.115 This 
test is broader than the legal effects test by inquiring whether the guidance has 
a substantial impact on regulated industries.116 But the test faces its own set of 
problems, namely that every agency action can arguably have a substantial 
impact on regulated entities.117 If the courts were to apply this test aggressive-
ly, they would chill agencies from ever issuing guidance, thus denying agen-
cies the beneficial uses of guidance.118 
A third method courts apply, which legal scholar Gary Lawson refers to 
as the “impact on agencies” test, is similar to the legal effects test, but instead 
asks whether agencies treat the guidance as binding over a period of time.119 In 
                                                                                                                           
Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 28 F.3d 1232, 1233 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (applying the “impact on 
agencies” test). 
 111 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 39; see Reginald Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: 
A Study in Overestimation, 60 YALE L.J. 581, 598 (1951); see also Thomas J. Fraser, Note, Interpre-
tative Rules: Can the Amount of Deference Accorded Them Offer Insight into the Procedural In-
quiry?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1303, 1311 (2010). 
 112 506 F.2d at 35–36, 39; Fraser, supra note 111, at 1311. 
 113 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 506 F.2d at 50–51; Fraser, supra note 111, at 1311. 
 114 Hickman, supra note 2, at 479 (noting that contemporary courts use agencies’ characteriza-
tions of their guidance documents merely as “a starting point”). 
 115 Fraser, supra note 111, at 1312. 
 116 See id.; see also Lewis-Mota, 469 F.2d at 482 (finding guidance document issued by Secretary 
of Labor that repealed precertification of certain occupations for visa issuance was invalid because it 
had a substantial impact both on immigrants and employers). 
 117 Hickman, supra note 2, at 480. 
 118 Id.; see supra notes 38–60 and accompanying text (outlining the benefits of guidance docu-
ments). 
 119 GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 378, 390 (6th ed. 2013); see Fraser, supra 
note 111, at 1313 (describing the “impact on agencies” test); supra notes 111–114 and accompanying 
text (explaining and analyzing the legal effects test). 
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U.S. Telephone Ass’n v. Federal Communication Commission, the U.S. Tele-
phone Association claimed that a statement of policy regarding penalties for 
violating the Communications Act was binding.120 After reviewing three hun-
dred adjudications, the D.C. Circuit determined that the U.S. Telephone Asso-
ciation followed the statement of policy in nearly every case, and the statement 
was therefore binding.121 The problem is that this test requires a substantial 
amount of past agency determinations, and therefore it cannot be used to eval-
uate guidance documents at the time they are issued.122 
The test adopted by most federal circuit courts is a multi-factor test de-
rived from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit’s 1993 decision in American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health 
Administration.123 In that case, the court stated that the determination of 
whether a guidance document should go through notice-and-comment rule-
making depends on whether the guidance document establishes a new duty or 
right.124 If the guidance document creates a new duty or right not previously 
legislated by Congress or promulgated by an agency through notice-and-
comment rulemaking, the guidance is invalid.125 But if the duty or right al-
ready existed, the agency can articulate that duty or right in greater detail.126 
 To determine whether the guidance document has legal effect, the court 
examined the following factors:  
(1) [W]hether in the absence of the rule there would not be an ade-
quate legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency action 
to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties, (2) whether 
the agency has published the rule in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, (3) whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general leg-
islative authority, or (4) whether the rule effectively amends a prior 
legislative rule.127 
An affirmative answer to any of those questions will suggest that the guidance 
document has a  legally binding effect in practice, and is therefore invalid.128 
 As the court notes, distinguishing between a guidance document that cre-
ates a new duty or right and one that merely interprets existing legislation or 
                                                                                                                           
 120 28 F.3d at 1233. 
 121 Id. at 1234. 
 122 LAWSON, supra note 119, at 390; see Fraser, supra note 111, at 1314. 
 123 995 F.2d 1106, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Hickman, supra note 2, at 481; see, e.g., Sweet v. 
Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing the American Mining test as a more comprehensive 
test for distinguishing guidance documents than any in the court’s own precedent). 
 124 Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1110; Anthony, supra note 109, at 15. 
 125 See Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1110, 1112; Anthony, supra note 109, at 15. 
 126 See Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1110, 1112; Anthony, supra note 109, at 15. 
 127 Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1112. 
 128 See id. 
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rules is difficult because every guidance document could claim to do both.129 
Although the American Mining test gets closer to solving this conundrum—
and outlining the factors to consider—it does not add much to the substance of 
the final determination.130 Whether there would have been “adequate legisla-
tive basis” for the agency action, or whether the guidance document “effective-
ly amends a prior legislative rule” are simply two ways of assessing whether 
the agency is creating a new, legally binding rule.131 The American Mining test 
does not provide a way of answering this question.132 
B. Procedural Challenges to Guidance Documents Are Insufficient 
All of these tests fail to resolve the issue because they only inquire about 
the general principle—that guidance documents cannot create practically legal-
ly binding rules.133 Guidance documents can have a substantial binding effect 
on entities even if courts do not recognize the guidance document as legally 
binding.134 Regardless of how carefully the courts consider various factors, 
they will always have to perform some fanciful reasoning to make their final 
determinations.135 The standard is therefore akin to the vague and general rule 
announced in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, in that if the guidance docu-
ment “goes too far”—a rule that puts very few parameters on judicial discre-
tion—it will be recognized as a legally binding rule requiring notice-and-
comment rulemaking.136 This leaves courts with great discretion to determine 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Id. at 1110. 
 130 See Anthony, supra note 109, at 20–21 (finding that the American Mining test breeds confu-
sion). Anthony instead proposes a two-step inquiry that asks, “Does the nonlegislative rulemaking 
document interpret existing legislation? . . . If it does not do so, has the agency nevertheless made it 
binding on the public?” Id. When the guidance document interprets existing legislation, it is a valid 
interpretive rule and need not go through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. When the guidance 
document is not interpretive of existing legislation and has not been made binding, it is a valid policy 
statement and need not go through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. Only when the guidance doc-
ument is not interpretative of the existing legislation and is practically binding should it be promulgat-
ed through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. 
 131 Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1112; see Anthony, supra note 109, at 21 (explaining that certain 
rules, which the American Mining test would presumably require to go through notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, could also be valid interpretative rules exempted from the statutory requirements of the 
Administrative Procedure Act). 
 132 See Am. Mining, 995 F.2d at 1112; William Funk, When Is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking a 
Clear Line Between NonLegislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 662 (2002). 
 133 See Funk, supra note 132, at 662; supra 111–132 and accompanying text. 
 134 See Funk, supra note 132, at 663, 663 n.25. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (finding that where government action re-
sults in the diminution of the value of property that is too great, it is a taking and must be compensated 
for by the government); see Funk, supra note 132, at 663. For another analogy, c.f. Jacobellis v. Ohio. 
378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (declining to define what constitutes pornography, but 
stating, “I know it when I see it”). 
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whether a guidance document is valid, and such discretion allows courts to act 
quasi-legislatively.137 
III. SUBSTANTIVELY CHALLENGING GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS 
Another way for courts to deal with agencies circumventing notice-and-
comment requirements is simply for judges to treat promulgated rules as bind-
ing and guidance documents as non-binding.138 This approach eliminates the 
need for courts to determine whether the rule is in practice legally binding or 
not.139 Under this scenario, if an agency treats a guidance document as binding 
and refuses to reconsider the guidance in a subsequent case, the court should 
strike down the agency’s action in that case because the agency did not explain 
why the guidance document should have governed.140 The agency then has two 
options: either go through the public scrutiny of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing on the front end—and avoid case-by-case adjudications in the future—or 
avoid rulemaking procedures and defend itself in every subsequent chal-
lenge.141 To understand how this proposal might solve the problem of guidance 
documents, it is necessary to first understand what actions entities may bring 
against agencies in court, and second, the level of deference agencies are af-
forded by the court if the entity succeeds in getting its case heard.142 
A. The Challenge: What Type of Action to Bring 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) generally provides three tests 
for judicial review of rules.143 Since the United States Supreme Court’s 1971 
decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, circuit courts have 
almost universally adopted the arbitrary and capricious test for review of in-
                                                                                                                           
 137 See Funk, supra note 132, at 663 (comparing procedural tests to a “pre-Vermont Yankee” 
world, referring to when judges themselves determined how much process an agency was required to 
undergo before adopting a rule, as opposed to following the standards set out in 5 U.S.C. § 553); Wil-
liam S. Morrow, A Brief Look at Agency Policy Statements and Interpretative Rules Under the APA, 
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Spring 2001, at 4, 5. 
 138 Franklin, supra note 1, at 279; Funk, supra note 132, at 663. 
 139 Franklin, supra note 1, at 279; Funk, supra note 132, at 663. 
 140 E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992). 
 141 Id. 
 142 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (estab-
lishing level of deference afforded an agency when interpreting a statute the agency is in charge of 
implementing); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe (Overton Park), 401 U.S. 402, 416–17 
(1971) (presenting the typical challenge to guidance documents); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand 
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413–14 (1945) (establishing level of deference afforded an agency when it inter-
prets its own regulations); Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (establishing level of defer-
ence afforded an agency when it issues a guidance document). 
 143 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E), (F) (2012); Pedersen, supra note 28, at 46–47. 
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formal rulemaking.144 In that case, the Secretary of Transportation approved 
funding for a highway to be built through a public park, but he did not provide 
any statement of factual findings as to why there existed no alternative routes 
or design changes to mitigate harm to the park.145 Petitioners, a combination of 
local residents and environmentalist organizations, contended that the Secre-
tary’s decision was invalid without such a finding, and the Court agreed.146 To 
make a finding under Section 706(2)(A), Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing 
for the Court, found that “the court must consider whether the decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a 
clear error of judgment.”147 To do this, the court must consider the full record, 
and where the record is lacking, testimony by administrative officials.148 Alt-
hough the standard of review is “narrow,” an inquiry into the facts must be 
“searching and careful.”149 This has become the most common test for arbi-
trary and capricious informal rulemakings.150 
B. Deference for Agencies Interpreting the Law 
A major distinction between administrative rules and guidance documents 
is the deference afforded them in court.151 Below is an outline of the various 
levels of deference the courts apply to agency interpretations of law.152 
1. Chevron Deference 
When an agency follows notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures un-
der Section 553 of the APA to promulgate an informal rule, agencies receive 
significant deference from the courts if the rule interprets a statute the agency 
administers.153 The standard of review for this situation was established in 
                                                                                                                           
 144 See 401 U.S. at 416–17 (1971); Appalachian Power Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 477 F.2d 495, 
505 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying “arbitrary and capricious” test to challenge rule concerning interpreta-
tion of Clean Air Act statute); Pedersen, supra note 28, at 48; see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, of 
the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46 (1983) (applying “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard test to challenge rule concerning seatbelts). 
 145 Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 404, 407–08. 
 146 Id. at 408–09, 420. 
 147 Id. at 416. 
 148 Id. at 420. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Pedersen, supra note 28, at 48; see note 144 and accompanying text. 
 151 See Raso, supra note 21, at 794 (noting the difference in deference afforded to rules versus 
guidance documents); infra notes 153–231 and accompanying text (explaining and analyzing the 
difference between different types of agency deference). 
 152 See infra notes 153–231 and accompanying text (explaining and analyzing the difference be-
tween different types of agency deference). 
 153 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; Jim Rossi, Respecting Deference: 
Conceptualizing Skidmore within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1115–
16 (2001). 
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1981 in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which involved an 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) interpretation of the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”) Amendments of 1977.154 The amendments imposed certain require-
ments on states that had not achieved national air quality standards established 
by EPA (“nonattainment states”).155 The amendments required nonattainment 
states to obtain a permit for any new or modified major stationary source of 
pollution.156 In 1980, EPA adopted a rule stating that if any part of a stationary 
source was replaced or modified, a permit was required.157 A year later, in 
1981, EPA adopted an alternative rule stating that as long as there was no in-
crease in aggregate emissions from the source, no permit was necessary.158 The 
question for the Court was whether EPA’s interpretation of the amendments 
was a permissible construction of the statute.159 Applying a two-part test, the 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of EPA.160 
The Chevron two-part test has become the benchmark case for determin-
ing whether an agency’s interpretation of its statute is permissible.161 The 
Court stated:  
First, always is the question whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end 
of the matter for the court; for the court, as well as the agency, must 
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed 
the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its 
own construction on the statute as would be necessary in the ab-
sence of an administrative interpretation. Rather if the statute is si-
lent or unambiguous with respect to the specific issue the question 
for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissi-
ble construction of the statute.162 
                                                                                                                           
 154 467 U.S. at 842; see 42 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(1) (2012); Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 14, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/enrd/chevron-usa-v-natural-
res-def-council [https://perma.cc/ML5D-FXUK] [hereinafter DEP’T OF JUSTICE]. 
 155 42 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(1); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40. 
 156 42 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(1); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40. 
 157 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 857. 
 158 See id. at 857–58. 
 159 See id. at 859. 
 160 Id. at 842–43, 866. 
 161 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 154; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43; see also Michigan v. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (applying Chevron to determine whether the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) interpretation of Clean Air Act was permissible); Util. Air Regu-
latory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2439 (2014) (applying Chevron to determine 
whether EPA’s interpretation of Clean Air Act was permissible). 
 162 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
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In almost every major case since the Chevron decision, courts have affirmed 
the agencies’ interpretation of its organic statute at step two.163 Therefore, 
whether the language of the statute is clear will almost certainly determine the 
case.164 
2. Skidmore Deference 
Courts afford less deference to informal agency actions outside the scope 
of notice-and-comment rulemaking.165 In 1944, the United States Supreme 
Court decided Skidmore v. Swift and established the early standard for defer-
ence to agency legal interpretations made in the context of informal adjudica-
tions.166 In Skidmore, the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division sub-
mitted an amicus brief clarifying an interpretative bulletin relating to the plain-
tiffs’ cause of action.167 The Court held that although the Administrator’s find-
ings were not based on adversary proceedings, the findings were still entitled 
to “respect”—something less than Chevron deference but more than de novo 
review.168 The Court stated that the weight afforded to guidance documents 
would “depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity 
of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”169 
These factors are to be weighed in totality to determine how much influence 
the guidance document should have.170 This level of deference is often referred 
to as Skidmore deference or “weak deference” because the court is not bound 
by the agency’s interpretation.171 
                                                                                                                           
 163 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 484–85 (2001) (finding the EPA inter-
pretation of an ambiguous statute unreasonable at step two because EPA’s interpretation would have 
rendered a subpart of the statute nugatory); Michigan v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 135 S. Ct. at 2711 (find-
ing EPA’s decision to regulate power plant unreasonable because EPA refused to consider costs of 
regulation); Marianne Kunz Shanor, Case Note, Administrative Law—The Supreme Court’s Impinge-
ment of Chevron’s Two-Step; Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S .Ct. 1498 (2009), 10 WYO. L. 
REV. 537, 552–53 (2010). 
 164 See Shanor, supra note 163, at 552–53. 
 165 Rossi, supra note 153, at 1116; see Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (establishing standard of defer-
ence afforded an agency when it acts outside the scope of notice-and-comment rulemaking); see also 
Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. 1391, 1402 (2013) (affording two opinion letters issued by 
the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Skidmore deference, but declining to afford 
Chevron deference). 
 166 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Rossi, supra note 153, at 1116, 1118. 
 167 Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. 
 168 Id. at 139–40. 
 169 Id. at 140. 
 170 Id. 
 171 Rossi, supra note 153, at 1110, 1117. 
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3. Chevron or Skidmore Deference for Guidance Documents? 
Following the Chevron decision, a question arose as to when a court 
should apply Chevron deference and when it should apply Skidmore defer-
ence.172 This question is important because if a court defers to an agency’s de-
cision, and the agency’s decision is based on a guidance document, the court 
essentially validates the guidance document and gives it legally binding ef-
fect.173 Whether the court affords an agency Chevron deference or Skidmore 
deference has important consequences for the effect of the guidance docu-
ment.174 
The Supreme Court addressed the question of Chevron versus Skidmore 
deference in Christensen v. Harris County, which involved an interpretation of 
overtime work under the Fair Labor Standards Act.175 Concerned about the 
costs of overtime pay, Harris County proposed to require its employees to take 
or use compensatory time in order to reduce their overtime pay.176 Harris 
County wrote to the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division to inquire 
whether its proposal was appropriate, and the Administrator approved the pro-
posal in an opinion letter, so long as the prior agreement allowed for it.177 Har-
ris County then implemented the policy, and its employees sued.178 The Court 
held that Skidmore deference applied to the agency’s opinion letter because the 
interpretation was not based on formal adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.179 And therefore, such interpretations did not warrant Chevron-
style deference.180 The Court’s ruling signified that interpretations in guidance 
are entitled to deference only to the extent that they have the “power to per-
suade,” and no more.181 
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court further clarified its position on 
informal agency interpretations of law in United States v. Mead Corp.182 After 
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treating Mead day planners as duty free for several years, the United States 
Customs Service reclassified them as “bound diaries,” subject to tariff.183 Tariff 
classification letters do not generally require notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
and they are binding only on the persons to whom the letter is addressed.184 
Any of the more than forty United States Customs Service offices may issue 
ruling letters, as may the Customs Headquarters Office.185 
In Mead, the Court denied Chevron deference to the United States Cus-
toms Service, finding that it applies only when “Congress would expect the 
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in 
the statute or fills a space in the enacted law . . . and the agency exercises such 
authority.”186 The first prong sought to ensure that Congress intended for the 
agency to make decisions regarding the relevant statutes, and the second prong 
sought to ensure that the agency was acting in that capacity, and not just inci-
dentally to it.187 In cases where Chevron deference does not apply, the Court 
preserved the possibility of Skidmore deference.188 Although the Court noted 
that notice-and-comment rulemaking and formal adjudication are both “very 
good indicator[s]” of Chevron treatment, such formality is not always re-
quired.189 The Court did not specifically address guidance documents, leaving 
the question of Chevron deference for those documents in flux.190 
The Supreme Court further attempted to clarify Mead in 2002 in Barnhart 
v. Walton.191 Barnhart concerned a provision of the Social Security Act that 
defined “disability” as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activi-
ty by reason of any medically determinable . . . impairment . . . which has last-
ed or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 
months.”192 Walton, who had developed a serious mental disability, was unable 
to work, or in statutory terms, “engage in any substantial gainful activity,” for 
eleven months, but then found permanent work before the twelve-month peri-
od ran.193 The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied Walton’s disabil-
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ity insurance benefits.194 Walton appealed, and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit held that the twelve-month duration requirement 
modified the word “impairment,” not the word “inability”; therefore, it did not 
matter that he returned to work in less twelve months.195 What mattered was 
that his impairment lasted, or would be expected to last, longer than twelve 
months.196 
Prior to the SSA’s decision, however, the SSA had issued a guidance doc-
ument interpreting the Social Security Act and its regulations promulgated un-
der the act.197 The guidance document stated that a claimant was not disabled if 
“within 12 months after the onset of an impairment . . . the impairment no 
longer prevents substantial gainful activity.”198 In 2001, probably to address 
the litigation, the SSA issued the same interpretation through notice-and-
comment rulemaking.199 Based on the guidance document and the subsequent 
final rule, the SSA concluded that Walton did not qualify for Social Security 
insurance benefits because Walton was able to engage in substantial gainful 
activity within eleven months.200 The Supreme Court upheld the SSA’s deci-
sion and rejected Walton’s argument—that the SSA’s interpretation was not 
entitled to Chevron deference because the SSA failed to promulgate the guid-
ance document through notice-and-comment rulemaking.201 
The Court in Barnhart announced that Chevron deference does not apply 
only to rules promulgated through notice-and-comment rulemaking.202 Rather, 
it will consider the following factors when determining whether to grant Chev-
ron deference to a guidance document: “the interstitial nature of the legal ques-
tion, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to ad-
ministration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the care-
ful consideration the Agency has given the question . . . .”203 Largely because 
the SSA’s interpretation of the statute was “longstanding”—and not necessarily 
because the SSA had promulgated a rule regarding the interpretation—the 
Court determined Chevron deference was due.204 
Although the considerations listed in Barnhart purportedly give lower 
courts more guidance for following Mead, they also allow the courts consider-
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able leeway in determining when to apply Chevron deference.205 As legal 
scholar Lisa Schultz Bressman notes, the problem with the Supreme Court’s 
guidance is that the tests can conflict, and in many cases Chevron deference 
depends more on the test the court chooses to apply than the rulemaking pro-
cedure that the agency uses.206 What is clear, though, is that Chevron deference 
is not necessarily ruled out for guidance documents that do not go through no-
tice-and-comment rulemaking.207 Furthermore, even if courts do not afford 
guidance documents Chevron deference, Skidmore deference may be sufficient 
in most cases for agency guidance document to prevail.208 
C. Deference for Agencies Interpreting Regulations 
When agencies interpret their own regulations, courts are even more def-
erential.209 In 1945, in Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., the United States 
Supreme Court established the standard of deference afforded to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations.210 Seminole Rock involved an interpreta-
tion of a regulation issued by the Office of Price Administration under the 
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.211 Justice Murphy, writing for the 
Court, started by stating that courts should only look to an agency’s interpreta-
tion of the regulation if the regulation is ambiguous.212 If there is ambiguity, 
courts “must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regula-
tion.”213 Although courts may consider Congressional intent and Constitutional 
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principles, the administrative interpretation controls unless it is plainly errone-
ous or inconsistent with the regulation.214  
The Court in Seminole Rock then proceeded to consider the issue in more 
detail.215 The Court first performed its own statutory interpretation of the text, 
arriving at the same conclusion as the agency.216 It then added that any ques-
tion regarding the Court’s interpretation of the regulation was erased by the 
agency’s own interpretation of it.217 The Court noted that the agency had is-
sued a bulletin concurrently with the regulation that addressed the exact is-
sue.218 The agency’s bulletin, in conjunction with its own interpretation of law, 
led the Court to rule in favor of the agency interpretation.219 Therefore, under 
Seminole Rock the courts give agencies enormous deference in interpreting 
their own regulations through guidance documents.220 
Although courts have generally accepted the Seminole Rock standard of 
deference, most notably in the 1997 decision Auer v. Robbins, the Supreme 
Court cut back somewhat on this level of deference and suggested that it might 
reevaluate the doctrine in the future.221 In Christopher v. SmithKline, for ex-
ample, the Court struck down an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations 
(via an amicus brief) defining “outside salesman” within the context of phar-
maceutical sales representatives.222 SmithKline held that deference might not 
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be appropriate when there is the possibility that the agency’s interpretation 
conflicts with an earlier interpretation, or if the interpretation seems merely to 
be a post hoc rationalization of a prior decision.223 SmithKline was a rare de-
parture from Seminole Rock deference, but it began the conversation for a pos-
sible shift in doctrine.224 
The problem with Seminole Rock deference was summed up nicely by Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Decker v. North-
west Environmental Defense Center.225 In that case, EPA submitted an amicus 
brief interpreting its Clean Water Act (“CWA”) regulations defining a discharge 
into navigable waters.226 The majority found EPA’s interpretation reasonable and 
deferred to EPA’s interpretation under Seminole Rock, especially because the 
interpretation was neither inconsistent from prior practice nor a post hoc ration-
alization arrived at only during litigation.227 Justice Scalia disagreed, writing, 
“[f]or decades, and for no good reason, we have been giving agencies the author-
ity to say what their rules mean, under the harmless-sounding banner of [Semi-
nole Rock deference].”228 Scalia continued, stating, “however great may be the 
efficiency gains derived from Auer [Seminole Rock] deference, beneficial effect 
cannot justify a rule that not only has no principled basis but contravenes one of 
the great rules of separation of powers: He who writes a law must not adjudge its 
violation.”229 In other words, Seminole Rock (or Auer) deference all but elimi-
nates judicial review of an agency action.230 This scheme creates the incentive 
for agencies to promulgate vague regulations, which they can later interpret us-
ing guidance documents without having to go through the onerous process of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.231 
D. Deference to Agencies Makes the Short-Cut Solution Unworkable 
Whether agencies receive Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, or 
Seminole Rock deference, the short-cut solution to guidance documents tilts the 
scale too far in favor of agency interpretations, thus giving guidance docu-
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ments greater effect than they deserve under the APA.232 Even if an agency 
issues a guidance document that is binding in practice, the court will generally 
defer to it so long as the statute or regulation is ambiguous and the guidance 
document is reasonable.233 Because agencies receive such deference, entities 
will be hesitant to challenge agencies in court and the guidance will stand.234 
IV. PROPOSING A SOLUTION 
This Note so far has explained why challenging guidance documents in 
court fails to solve the problem that guidance documents present—namely that 
agencies use guidance documents to make legally binding rules without going 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.235 Furthermore, finality and ripeness 
issues make it difficult for parties to even challenge these practices in court.236 
This Note proposes an altogether different solution, one based on executive 
review of agency guidance documents.237 The proposal rejects judicial review 
as the primary method to challenge guidance documents, and instead gives it to 
the executive.238 The proposal not only offers a more practical solution to the 
problem of transparency, but it also increases accountability in the executive 
branch.239 
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A. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs Model 
Executive review of guidance documents is not new.240 Since Richard 
Nixon, presidents have taken steps to oversee agency action beyond the re-
quirements enumerated in the Administrative Procedure Act.241 President Nix-
on implemented a system under the Office of Management and Budget 
(“OMB”), under which the OMB circulated proposed rules to other agencies 
for comment.242 In 1980, Congress created the Office of Information and Reg-
ulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) within the OMB, and in 1981 President Ronald 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291, which centralized executive review of 
agency rulemaking in the OMB and OIRA.243 Under this scheme, agencies 
were required to submit proposed and final rules, along with regulatory impact 
assessments (“RIAs”), to OIRA for review before publishing them in the Fed-
eral Register.244 The goal of Executive Order 12,291 featured three key ele-
ments: centralized review of agency action, additional analytical requirements 
for agency rulemaking beyond the APA, and an express focus on presidential 
priorities.245 The order advanced democratic principles by giving the president, 
the only elected official in the executive branch, more control over agency 
rulemaking.246 
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush modified the scope of OIRA 
review to include what they termed “significant” rules and guidance.247 In 
1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866, which replaced 
Reagan’s Executive Order.248 That order limited OIRA review to “economical-
ly significant” rules, including rules “with an economic impact of $100 million 
or more,” and “those raising novel legal or policy issues, among other 
rules.”249 In 2007, Bush issued Executive Order 13,422, which required OIRA 
to review “significant guidance documents” out of concern that agencies stra-
tegically avoided review through alternative rulemaking tactics.250 President 
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Obama maintained much of Bush’s OIRA review structure and continued to 
review some agency guidance documents.251 
OIRA review, however, does not solve the problem of guidance docu-
ments because entities themselves are not able to bring direct challenges to the 
agencies regarding guidance documents.252 Although the executive has an in-
terest in how agencies implement laws, it will not have the same incentive as 
entities to strike down invalid, binding guidance documents.253 This leaves 
entities with little protection from agency overreach in the form of guidance 
documents.254 
B. Mendelson’s Proposal 
Legal scholar Nina Mendelson has suggested a petition system to address 
the above-stated problem.255 Under Mendelson’s scheme, Congress would pass 
an amendment entitling citizens to receive notice when an agency issues guid-
ance documents and to petition the agency to revise or repeal them.256 The 
agency would have 180 days to respond to the petition, after which the agency 
could either modify the document or defend its position publicly.257 The agen-
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cy could defend its position either by arguing that the petition did not demand 
a substantive response or by publishing the guidance document for a full no-
tice-and-comment procedure.258 The agency’s response, or failure to respond, 
would be subject to judicial review.259 In order to avoid multiple petitions of 
the same guidance document, the agency could publish notice of the petition 
and allow other parties to join.260 
Mendelson gives a number of reasons for why this proposal would be su-
perior to the current scheme.261 For one, agencies would have to respond to the 
substance of the guidance document, creating a dialogue comparable to that of 
a notice-and-comment proceeding or an enforcement action.262 The agency’s 
response would create a more coherent record for judicial review.263 Second, 
the specter of a petition would encourage agencies to be more judicious in their 
use of guidance documents, and to consult affected entities prior to issuing 
guidance documents.264 Third, the petition requirement would narrow judicial 
review to familiar questions such as whether the agency’s decision is arbitrary 
and capricious.265 The court, therefore, would not be bogged down by the ten-
uous tests described above in Part II of this Note.266 
Mendelson’s proposal raises a number of problems though, most signifi-
cantly the cost of time and money to the agency.267 If agencies are required to 
either respond to every petition, or go through a notice-and-comment-like pro-
cess, they might avoid guidance documents except when absolutely neces-
sary.268 Mendelson addresses this shortcoming by allowing agencies to argue 
that the petition does not require a substantive response.269 But this fix could 
hinder the process, based on the fact that courts generally avoid telling agen-
cies how to use their resources.270 Therefore, courts would generally defer to 
the agency and reject the petition without meaningful review.271 Given the im-
portant benefits of guidance documents, it would be mistaken either to burden 
agencies with defending the guidance documents incessantly, or to require the 
                                                                                                                           
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id. at 440–41. 
 262 Id. at 440. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. at 441. 
 265 Id. 
 266 See id.; supra notes 106–137 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing procedural 
challenges to guidance documents); see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 506 F.2d 
33, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (establishing legal effects test). 
 267 See Mendelson, supra note 38, at 441–42; Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 367–68. 
 268 See Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 368. 
 269 See Mendelson, supra note 38, at 439; Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 368. 
 270 Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 368; see Mendelson, supra note 38, at 439. 
 271 Seidenfeld, supra note 4, at 368; see Mendelson, supra note 38, at 439. 
386 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 44:357 
agency to follow notice-and-comment procedures every time a party petitions 
a guidance document.272 
C. This Note’s Proposal: The Office of Guidance Review 
This Note proposes a solution similar to that of Mendelson’s, but it substi-
tutes executive review for judicial review of petitions.273 For convenience, this 
agency will be referred to as the Office of Guidance Review (“OGR”). The 
review would work as follows. After an agency issues a guidance document, 
the agency would be required to issue notice of the guidance document in a 
public record similar to the Federal Register.274 Entities would then have the 
opportunity to petition OGR.275 OGR would have the authority to review peti-
tions at its own discretion.276 If OGR decides to review a petition, it would no-
tify the agency, allowing it either to initiate a notice-and-comment procedure 
or to defend the guidance document before OGR.277 OGR would have the au-
thority to review the guidance document facially—that is, OGR would deter-
mine whether the rule is practically legally binding using a test similar to the 
test derived from American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin-
istration.278 If OGR determines the guidance document is legally binding, the 
agency has three options: it can (1) rescind it; (2) go through notice-and-
comment rulemaking to promulgate a rule; or (3) request the president to issue 
the guidance document as an executive order.279 If OGR determines the guid-
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ance document is valid, then the petitioning agency retains the right to appeal 
the decision in court.280 
There are five primary benefits to OGR review. First, allowing OGR to 
review petitions at its discretion would avoid preliminary issues of ripeness 
and finality.281 Guidance documents are by their nature informal and nonbind-
ing, meaning entities generally cannot challenge a guidance document in court 
until they violate it and are penalized.282 Even if an entity is able to prove a 
guidance document is ripe and final, the time and money it costs an entity to 
do so will often encourage it to acquiesce to the guidance document.283 
Second, because OGR would be directly under the control of the Presi-
dent, this proposed review would lend greater legitimacy to agency action.284 
Unlike judges and administrators, the president is an elected official.285 By giv-
ing OGR the discretion to review guidance documents, the president becomes 
more accountable for agency action.286 If entities are unhappy with the presi-
dent’s actions toward individual guidance documents, they can vote him out.287 
Third, the petition process gives the public a voice in agencies’ decision-
making.288 Although a petition does not rise to the same level of involvement 
and public scrutiny as notice-and-comment rulemaking, it still gives important 
feedback to the agency.289 It also has the benefit of creating a record for judi-
cial review in the future.290 
Fourth, as explained above, the various tests courts use to determine 
whether guidance documents are legally binding are vague, and they depend 
substantially on the discretion of the court.291 Allowing the executive to deter-
mine what the law is up front, instead of leaving it to the courts to decide on an 
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ad hoc basis, is more in line with the constitution’s separation of powers.292 
Shifting the responsibility of guidance review from the courts to OGR would 
limit the court’s quasi-legislative power.293 By reducing deference afforded to 
the agency, the executive would be held more accountable for the administra-
tive action, thus creating greater legitimacy and encouraging agencies to con-
sider input from the public.294 
Finally, OGR review would leave the great majority of guidance docu-
ments undisturbed, removing the cloud of uncertainty that often hangs over 
them; this promotes good government because most guidance documents are 
beneficial, even essential, to the administrative state.295 OGR will have the dis-
cretion to review only those guidance documents its sees as an abuse of agency 
power.296 
CONCLUSION 
Guidance documents are a necessary tool in the modern administrative 
state, but they also pose problems. Guidance documents are meant to be non-
binding memoranda, but in practice they have the ability to create binding law. 
Unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking, agencies are not required to seek in-
put from the public, and their decision-making process can be far less transpar-
ent. As a result, guidance documents further undermine the already-tenuous 
authority agencies have to execute the laws of the United States. Current and 
proposed judicial tests devised to determine whether a guidance document is 
binding—namely the “short cut” and the American Mining test—have largely 
failed to address guidance documents’ shortcomings. 
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 This Note suggests that it is best to give the branch of government re-
sponsible for executing the law the authority to regulate itself. The president is 
an elected official who is accountable to the public. If stakeholders or the pub-
lic are unhappy with the president’s choices, they can speak with their votes. 
Furthermore, although a petition is less powerful than notice-and-comment 
rulemaking, the petition would nonetheless give the public a voice. A petition 
would give the public a path to challenge guidance documents when doctrines 
of ripeness and finality would otherwise prevent them from doing so. Finally, 
discretionary OGR review would allow the majority of beneficial guidance 
documents to continue to be issued without interference. 
  
 
